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1. The decomposition of the ancient Mexican political regime
In contrast to most authoritarian regimes in Latin America, which were basically
military and anti-popular, based upon a coup d’Etat that overthrew a national-popular
regime such as those existing in Argentina and Brazil (established in the thirties at about
the same time as the one of Mexico), the Mexican regime had enough legitimacy to endu-
re until the year two thousand. Nevertheless, its legitimacy capital began to quickly run
down with the change of economic model as a result of the economic 1982 crisis.
The Mexican political regime drew its legitimacy from its revolutionary (nationalist
and popular) origins. Its institutionalization was achieved at two different moments: the
first in 1929, when the party which was to rule for the next 71 years was created, the
second in 1938, when the elite party was transformed into a mass party. The precursor of
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was conceived as a mechanism to allow the
ruling elites to negotiate and solve their differences institutionally, rather than through
the violence that had characterized prior power transmissions. The founding of the
National Revolutionary Party (PNR) institutionalized the power struggle. In 1938, during
the presidency of Lazaro Cárdenas, a mass party regrouping the popular sectors: trade
unions, peasant organizations and other popular organizations, substituted this elite orga-
nization.
The fact that in the old regime the State was the main agent of development, toget-
her with the way the regime was constituted, basically as an institutionalization from
above, left society in a subordinate position. The government spoke in the name of the
people and accumulated attributions that allowed it to control the different social organi-
zations that were part of the pact. It concentrated the capacity to intervene in the activity
and internal affairs of trade unions and peasant organizations: it had the faculty of accep-
ting or denying the registry of a specific union or peasant organization as well as its lea-
dership, of deciding upon the legality of strikes and collective negotiations between
employers and workers. The pact also created the institutional framework that allowed
the reproduction of the regime through clientelism and the cooptation of the independent
organizations and leadership, and finally through selective repression of the more radi-
cal elements.
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The corporatist pact survived until the 1982 crisis, when the economic capacity of the
State reduced dramatically. From this date on, the State was obliged to give up its role as
agent of development, something that implied the reduction of its investments and even-
tually forced the opening of the Mexican economy. This situation had as its consequen-
ce a radical decrease in the capacity of the corporatist regime to continue giving privile-
ges and subsidies to its bases: the workers of the most strategic economic sectors (most
of them owned by the State) and the social agricultural sector (the ejidos).
This situation eventually led the government of De la Madrid (1982-88) to altoget-
her abandon the nationalist and popular project. Although this eroded the legitimacy of
the State and of the regime, as well as of the popular organizations they were based on,
it did not radically change the control faculties of the State upon the social organizations
that constitute the PRI. Although the retreat of the State profoundly reduced the capacity
of the PRI organizations to control their membership in clientelistic terms, the State
maintained the tight administrative controls and the allegiance of most of the officialist
leadership that established itself during the more than 50 years that the regime had been
in place. This allowed the government to impose drastic austerity measures and the res-
tructuring of the economy with little resistance on the part of the popular sectors.
During the presidency of De la Madrid, the Mexican government once again modi-
fied the character of the political regime without changing its nature. It again changed the
alliance: it was now the entrepreneurs that were to be the beneficiaries of the intent to
make the Mexican economy more productive and more competitive at the international
level. The same strategy was followed by Salinas, who had success not only in abando-
ning the popular character of the original alliance, but also the national one. With the sig-
ning of NAFTA, what changed was that the government sought the North-American
capitals as partners in order to incorporate the Mexican economy to the international
arena, rather than rely on the national entrepreneurs.
There was, nonetheless, a crucial difference between both presidencies. At the begin-
ning of his presidency, De la Madrid though that the PRI would be able to appeal to the
urban and middle classes in order to win elections, by advocating a realistic and techni-
cally correct management of the crisis, instead of depending on the clientelistic and
popular support the regime. The first signs showing that this strategy was a failure were
the local elections in Chihuahua in 1983, where the PRI practically lost all the major
cities, precisely where this more urban and middle class population lived in. The result
was that the government had to abandon this strategy and once again rely on the tradi-
tional corporatist leadership and on electoral fraud, such as the one of 1985 in Chihuahua
and of 1988 at the national level.
When Salinas took office after the contested elections of 1988, the governmental
strategy changed radically. He discarded the idea that the PRI would be able to stay in
power based upon a more solid experience of government, while its traditional bases
were left behind. On the other hand, the possibility of continuing to win elections
through fraud was drastically reduced in a context where the government had to face a
more conscious and better-organized civil society and greater vigilance from the interna-
tional scene. Salinas’s government intended to maintain the support of the traditional
corporatist apparatus, although it functioned less and less effectively, until it was ready
to substitute it by other organized social forces and eventually establish a new party
apparatus.
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Because most of the legitimacy of the original alliance was extinguished, and both
the State and the popular organizations were showing less capacity to deliver privileges
to the most strategic popular organizations upon which the corporatist pact was based,
the government of Salinas again changed the character of the regime in order to convert
it into a basically clientelistic pact targeted to the poorest sectors of society. The govern-
ment established the Solidarity program in order to substitute a clientelistic structure
mediated through the corporatist organizations, by a clientelistic system linked to the
presidency, that would directly relate the “agency” that concentrated the economic
resources in Mexico to “organizations” based upon a primary identity, defined by their
living quarters and their immediate needs (Zermeño 1994).
Nevertheless, the project of constituting a clientelistic State to substitute the corpo-
ratist one, was condemned to fail in the mid-term, as it further weakened the organiza-
tions and institutions of the national-popular pact. Although this clientelistic State func-
tioned conjuncturally1, it was not capable of generating a durable new alliance between
the State and society, nor was it capable of refurbishing the regime with legitimacy. This
was not possible because the clientelistic pact was built upon conjunctural and particu-
laristic needs and not upon longer lasting interests or projects.
This intent to constitute a clientelistic pact independent of the organizations of the
national-popular pact not only failed to establish solid popular organizations, but actually
contributed to sap the former of the legitimacy they still had and greatly affected their
efficacy. On the other hand, it also contributed to eventually weaken the presidency as it
was evidenced during the administration of Zedillo.
The political and economic crisis of 1994 made it clear that the intent to constitute a
clientelistic pact had failed. The region where the indigenous Zapatista Army of
Liberation (EZLN) appeared had been the one receiving the most resources from
“Solidaridad”. On the other hand, the presidential candidate of the PRI, who had been the
director of program, was assassinated in March. His substitute, an economist who had
been secretary of Education, Ernesto Zedillo, reduced the Solidarity program to its mini-
mum, abandoning the political project of the previous administration. On the other hand,
the remaining institutions of the national-popular regime, such as the Mexican Institute
of Social Security (IMSS) and the CONASUPO –an agency that subsidized the prices of
agricultural products both to producers and consumers– started being dismantled. All of
this had the effect of continuing to sap the ancient regime of its content, further weake-
ning the traditional clientelistic instruments, and making the Mexican State less and less
capable of controlling the process of political liberalization.
This process further slid from the control of the incumbents when, as a result of the
1994 crisis, the weakened position of the Salinas government, and the pressure of the
opposition parties that had strongly contested the elections of 1988, an agreement betwe-
en the three major parties was reached to create an autonomous institution to organize the
elections that were previously organized by the government; although for the elections of
1994 the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) still maintained the secretary of the Interior as
its president. This last element was changed in 1996, when the present IFE was created,
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with complete independence from the government; with 9 counselors, recommended by
the major political parties and voted by Congress with a two third majority. All this
amounted to the fact that in the year 2000 we would face an election where the PRI would
not be able to control the outcome of the election and would have relatively less capacity
to offer permanent clientelistic advantages to influence people’s votes.
In this manner, the principal factor of power of the Mexican political regime, the pre-
sidency2 was being strongly eroded. The Mexican constitution had given the Mexican
president an array of ample power instruments. But even more importantly, during the
more than 70 years that had elapsed since the centralization of power in the twenties, the
presidency had been able to accumulate an enormous amount of meta-constitutional
attributions, that in other political systems is in the hands of other institutions. The
incumbent president could choose its successor, act as an arbiter in the political disputes
between members of his party, decide most of public policies, initiate most of the law
making procedures, name the Supreme Court judges, and act as the main distributor of
benefits. When all the governors and the great majority of members of the federal and
state assemblies came from the PRI, the President could easily control the whole politi-
cal scenario. He could threaten the governors with a censorship motion at the Senate and
force their resignation, he could absolutely control the legislative process and the judi-
ciary system by nominating the Supreme Court and other high-ranking judges. In addi-
tion, the head of the Bank of Mexico was part of the presidential cabinet and not an inde-
pendent body as it is today.
Since the second half of the eighties, but especially during the last PRI presidency of
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), these extraordinary faculties suffered a reflux (Meyer
1996). Part of them went to the Chamber of Deputies, some to the PRI itself, and still
others to the governors of the PRI and of the opposition parties. Even before the PRI lost
the presidential elections in the year 2000, it had already lost more than 10 States to
opposition parties, one of them Mexico City; Mexico’s largest city, where 25% of the
population lives. In addition, although in many states the PRI still exerted the executives,
it no longer controlled the local legislatures, and many municipalities were in the hands
of opposition parties. In the 1977 elections the PRI lost the majority of the Chamber of
Deputies, which meant that the President could no longer modify the Constitution as he
had done so often before. This change also implied that Congress would no longer limit
itself to pass the initiatives that came from the presidency.
With the weakening of the PRI at the national and at the local level, the president lost
his grip on his own party. The governors of the PRI gained increasing autonomy with res-
pect to the Presidency. At the beginning of the Zedillo presidency the PRI of Tabasco
rebelled against the federal government in support of its governor (obviously controlled
and manipulated by him). It stood up against the agreement that the Zedillo administra-
tion had reached with the opposition parties to sign a comprehensive political agreement
that included the deposition of the governor of Tabasco (who had arrived to the gover-
norship after a dubious campaign and election) and made it fail. It is this same governor,
Madrazo, that in the year 2000 forced Zedillo to accept to hold a primary election for the
first time in the history of the PRI, and ran against the “official” presidential candidate,
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Labastida. It is this same governor who succeeded in having his local candidate elected
in similarly dubious elections in August 2000, and imposed an interim governor when the
Federal Electoral Court annulled the former election.
This rebellion of the Governor of Tabasco was not isolated; other governors of the
PRI followed. The governor of Yucatán, Victor Cervera Pacheco, succeeded in reelecting
himself in elections marked by many irregularities; the main one being that he had alre-
ady served as interim governor during the previous four years, something that legally
impeded him from running again. This same governor is at present the main protagonist
of a serious electoral conflict, which this time involves the rejection of a decision by the
Federal Electoral Court. Nevertheless, it was not only the governors that showed their
autonomy from a weaker presidency, but also other organizations that had been easily
controlled by the presidency and the PRI in the past. After the death of the Secretary
General of the largest trade union confederation of the country, the Confederation of
Mexican Workers (the CTM), the government of Zedillo failed to impose a modernizer
at its head, and one of the most traditional leaders was elected.
As far as this means that the power formerly concentrated on the presidency has
diminished and counterweights to the executive have been created, it is a positive evolu-
tion. Nevertheless, what this also means is that we are living a process of feudalization
of political power in Mexico, a dispersion of power that is having as its consequence that
in some regions (Yucatán, Tabasco, Campeche, among others) and organizations (the
CTM, the CROC, the CROM) political power is falling in the hands of the most tradi-
tional leadership, that have been active in resisting the process of democratization
(Bizberg 1999). In effect, although the democratization of the country started in certain
localities and regions, mainly in the Northern and Northeastern part of the country, the
local level now mainly serves as the refuge of the traditional politicians that have waged
the war against the more reformist ones: the technocrats that gained power during the
1982 crisis. The technocrats that presented themselves as the only ones capable of sol-
ving the economic crisis (in part because they had the support of the international finan-
cial agencies that were to allocate the enormous amounts of loans the country needed)
had until the presidency of Salinas the capacity to control the party apparatus and the tra-
ditional politicians. With the weakening of the PRI at the national level (especially now
that it has lost the presidency), the strongholds of the traditional politicians will be these
local governments and organizations, from where they will try to recuperate not only the
National PRI that is still in the hands of the allies of the technocrats, but the presidency.
In addition to the dispersion of the power that was concentrated on the presidency,
there has been a process of generalized weakening of the popular organizations under the
control of the PRI. The labor, peasant and other popular movements depended on a cor-
poratist relationship with the State, through which political support and control of the
demands of the popular sectors were exchanged for economic and political privileges for
the leadership and clientelistic benefits for workers and peasants. From 1982 on, this
situation had to be reversed, first because the intervention of the State receded, then
because the Mexican economy opened and imposed an increased international competi-
tion on the Mexican companies and the countryside, when the country entered GATT in
1986.
The generalized weakening of the corporatist organizations that mediated between
the State and the social sectors occurred in a context in which the State-PRI maintained
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its administrative and political control mechanisms almost untouched and continued
exerting its hegemony over the (reduced) resources to distribute goods (public works,
living quarters, drainage, water, electricity, etc.)3. This fact did not permit that the decre-
ased legitimacy and representativity of these organizations translate into massive popu-
lar opposition. In its turn, this means that the power vacuum created by the decomposi-
tion of the corporatist regime is not being filled by the emergence of independent popu-
lar or civic organizations, but on the contrary, by the local “caciques” resulting from the
feudalization of the PRI and by the strengthening of openly illegal forces trafficking with
drugs, migrants, stolen cars, smuggling, kidnapping, etc.
2. Civil society and the Mexican transition
Some transitions have seen massive social movements against the old regime, such
as Poland, with Solidarity, and to a lesser degree Brazil, with the organized entrepreneurs
and workers. Other transitions have been the consequence of the massive organization of
civic associations, such as the Hungarian, or of the spontaneous emergence of civil
society as the Czechoslovakian and East German. Still others have been mainly the effect
of the decomposition of the old regime, such as the case of the ex-USSR. Although the
Mexican has also been dominated by the decomposition of the “ancient regime”, it has
partly been the result of the pressure of political and social forces that questioned its legi-
timacy. In order to evaluate the capacity of the Mexican society to reconstruct a political
regime after more than 30 years of decomposition of the ancient one, we will have to
review the capacity of civil society to organize itself and struggle against the old regime.
2.1. Labor and peasant organizations
As discussed above, the regime was based upon an alliance with the popular sectors
that eventually derived into a subordination of these sectors and their organizations to the
State. Nonetheless, this relationship of dependence of the labor and peasant organizations
to the State was also characterized by periodic outbursts of discontent. One of the most
massive movements was the upsurge of independent trade unions and peasant organiza-
tions of the early seventies. Although this movement was short lived and did not contri-
bute much to actively dismantle the old regime, it was crucial to show the limits of the
capacity of independent movements to organize in Mexico, as well as the difficulties of
the regime to refurbish its legitimacy and renew its control over its social basis after the
1968 conflict.
These movements were also very important in questioning the subordination of the
unions to the State and the existence of a leadership that responded first to the directives
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of the government than to the demands of the workers. They also questioned the lack of
democracy within the unions, as well as in other popular organizations, as the main sup-
port for the existence of this type of leadership. That these were the main reasons for the
emergence of this broad movement of union independence and not economic questions
is proven by the fact that although the presidency of Echeverría had a contradictory eco-
nomic balance, not only wages reached a historic high in 1976, but the government esta-
blished various institutions directed to subsidize housing and furniture for the workers
and distributed large amounts of good, arable land.
These independence movements (Basurto 1983; Gómez Tagle 1980; Middlebrook
1989) started in the economic sectors that had gone through a process of modernization,
that had the most complex production and organization processes, and that correspon-
dingly required more qualified, better schooled, and younger workers. Among these sec-
tors were the automobile and auto-parts, electronic, airlines, telephone and electricity
industries, and education services. In the countryside, the movement began in the regions
that had experienced the fastest development, such as the extensively irrigated and highly
exporting regions of the Northeastern part of Mexico.
This pressure for change in some popular sectors coincided with the will on the part
of Echeverría’s government to accept and even encourage it. This attitude of the govern-
ment was crucial because the Ministry of Labor has such a great capacity to intervene in
the internal questions of union and peasant organizations, especially regarding the deci-
sion to accept or reject the result of an internal election favoring an autonomous lea-
dership and the decision of a union to leave an official confederation. In fact, the govern-
ment of Echeverría actually induced the liberalization of the popular organizations. A few
months after taking office the president affirmed that worker’s assemblies had the right
to freely choose their own leadership and to decide to which Confederation they wanted
to pertain.
The fact that the more salient and active leaders4 leading the movement were closely
linked to the government, made the movement of “worker’s insurgence” (insurgencia
obrera) more and more dependent on the attitude of the government towards it. This had
as its consequence that as soon as this latter changed its attitude, the movement lost its
impetus. This occurred when, nearing the end of his term, president Echeverría was for-
ced to increasingly rely on the traditional leaders to face the economic crisis that occu-
rred in 1976, as well as to have the capacity to impose his candidate to the presidency, as
was the tradition in the PRI governments. The government had to stop supporting the
independent movement in order to regain the support of the traditional popular leaders-
hip. And as soon as it did so, the movement stopped short. The next government, that of
López Portillo, decided to recuperate the confidence of the Mexican and foreign entre-
preneurs, helped the officialist union movement to recuperate the still existing indepen-
dent unions.
Although the movement was stopped short at its peak in June 1976, when the army
prevented a strike of its main actor, the “democratic current” of the electrical workers
union, the SUTERM, the prestige of the officialist popular organizations was gravely
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attained, something which further eroded the legitimacy of the corporatist organizations.
Their legitimacy further declined due to their unconditional acceptance of the austerity
measures and the retreat of the State beginning 1982, that hardly hit the workers and the
other popular classes. This process went on with their incapacity to defend the workers
from the consequences of the decision to open the Mexican economy, which gave way
to a profound process of enterprise restructuring.
The independent peasant movement (Gordillo 1989; Harvey 1990; Robles & Moguel
1989; Sanderson 1981) was much more easily defused, due to its atomization. In the first
place, each of the organizations representing a group of peasants usually fought indivi-
dually to get land. Then, once it obtained it, usually through invading a terrain, claiming
its property and forcing the authorities to expropriate it, it subsided. During the govern-
ment of José López Portillo (1976-82), the financial resources coming from the petro-
leum exports decreased the pressure coming from the independent organizations that had
received land during the previous presidency, which were now demanding resources to
sow and commercialize their product. On the other hand, the government repressed or
was successful in marginalizing the organizations that were still demanding land and that
had united in the National Confederation “Plan de Ayala” (CNPA) against the intent to
put an end to the Agrarian Reform.
During the administration of Salinas, the main independent peasant organization: the
UNORCA5, was finally coopted by the government of Salinas, by backing its leader in
his effort to attain the direction of the National Peasant Confederation (CNC). This appa-
rent triumph of the independent union against the officialist leadership turned out to be
the end of the autonomy of the most important independent peasant movement of the
seventies and eighties. The fact that under the leadership of the UNORCA the CNC did
not react, and even backed, the 1992 reforms of the Constitution that put an end to the
Agrarian Reform and gave peasants the possibility of selling their ejido lands finished
completely discrediting this organization. It was further weakened when it was time to
contest the opening of the country to imports of maize and beans, signed in the NAFTA
agreement.
In this way, in these last thirty years, the successive PRI governments managed to
revert the impact of the upsurge of the independent unions and peasant organizations, and
to restore the domination of the officialist organizations, through administrative and legal
mechanisms, as well as through cooptation and repression. On the other hand, the capa-
city of the State to maneuver and fill the organizational space with its own organizations,
has made social movements to tend to rely on elite agreements with the Mexican
Presidency, that always turned against and delegitimized them. Both of these situations
have produced short-lived alternative social movements and organizations, even though
the legitimacy and pretension of representativity of the officialist organizations has been
continuously worn out.
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Nevertheless, we might well be at present seeing a germ of change in this relatively
closed situation. The creation of the National Worker’s Union (UNT) in 1997 has been a
qualitatively fundamental event in the history of the workers movement in Mexico, as it
is the first confederation created independently of the State. This organization grouped
some of the most active unions in the country: among others the telephone worker’s
union, the union of the Volkswagen plant in Puebla, and the airline workers unions. They
have surely managed to exert pressure on their own enterprises, in order to get much hig-
her wages and benefits than the rest of the trade union movement. Nevertheless, they
appear to have limited their organization to defend exclusively corporatist interests,
because their action has been restricted to their own enterprises. This impression has
been reinforced by the fact that they have not led an important movement opposing the
neo-liberal measures taken by the last three PRI governments, nor against the authorita-
rian political regime led by the PRI. In fact, the leader of one of the most important
unions of the Confederation, the Telephone workers union, is a member of the PRI and
had an explicit alliance with former president Salinas, which led many observers to think
that he was trying to emulate what the UNORCA did in the CNC, and conquer the pre-
sidency of the CTM through an agreement with the government. The fact is that the UNT
has not been able to expand considerably its membership to other important unions, and
that it has been incapable of quantitatively altering the correlation of forces in the trade
union movement.
Thus, in contrast to other Latin American or East-Central European transitions,
where organized labor movement was crucial for the democratization of the regime and
society, organized workers and peasants in Mexico have expressed their opposition to the
regime only in some rare occasions, and almost always under government control. On
the one hand, the PRI has managed to occupy most of the political space and preserve
the loyalty of the popular organizations to the ancient regime. On the other hand, inde-
pendent organizations either fell in the trap of trying to ally with the government in order
to achieve power from above, or have adopted a critical but corporatist position. This
prevented the appearance of a strong organized opposition against the regime, allowing
the PRI to control the rate of political liberalization and make the Mexican transition one
of the longest in the world.
In fact, most of the worker’s, peasant and popular (taxi drivers, street vendors, etc.)
organizations are still loyal to the PRI, even after it lost the presidency. The big question
is whether these organizations will continue to ally to the ailing PRI, or if they will start
experiencing a growing discontent from their bases, that may eventually lead them to
abandon this party. Nevertheless, our main question deals with the fact that if we accept
that there is more to a transition than mere elections, and that democracy means the capa-
city to reconstruct society in terms that allow and habituate society to solve conflicts pea-
cefully while respecting differences, the control of the social space by the State is a great
obstacle.
2.2. Civic and social movements
The most influential civic movement in Mexico in the last thirty years has surely
been the 1968 student movement. More than in any other country in the world, the stu-
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dent movement in Mexico was more political than cultural. Although the movement had
salient cultural traits, it soon became fundamentally political (Zermeño 1978), because it
encountered the authoritarian regime at the peak of its consolidation. The consequence
that it adopted a political character and began posing the democratization of the Mexican
regime as its main demand, was that it derived into a direct confrontation with the
government. The result of this situation was the well-known massacre of students in
Tlaltelolco in October.
Although this movement constitutes a crucial moment in the history of Mexico, and
has a very strong symbolic significance and a durable impact on the political culture of
the political and cultural elite, it was weakly organized. This characteristic meant that
after the repression, it not only failed to institutionalize, but practically disappeared as a
movement. It was only 7 years later, in 1975, that some of the leaders participated in the
creation of the professors’ union of the National University. Then in 1977, the Mexican
Communist Party was legalized as part of the political reform of the López Portillo’s
administration. These two events were in many ways influenced by that movement.
Nevertheless, the more immediate result of the way the State responded to the students
was the expansion of the guerrilla movement that had emerged in the early sixties in
Chihuahua, in the North of Mexico, and in Guerrero.
Other successors of this movement were the ample array of non-governmental orga-
nizations the emerged in the nineties, and that met in Mexico City in the “National
Citizen Organizations Encounter” of 1995. The 568 organizations of that reunion were
dedicated to the most varied questions: women, human rights, electoral observation, ser-
vices to the handicapped, gay and lesbian rights, prostitutes and aids patients support,
rural development, ecology, etc. (San Juan 1999). The contribution to the organization of
civil society and to the promotion of the economic, social and political aspects each of
these organizations occupies itself is more than evident. Moreover, most observers also
agree that they greatly contributed to prepare the defeat of the PRI at the 2000 elections.
The organizations devoted to electoral observation at the local level between 1991
and 1994 finally coincided and convinced other NGO’s dedicated to other questions, that
it was urgent to unite their efforts in order to observe the Federal elections of 1994. These
presidential elections were to take place in very critical conditions: after the zapatista
rebellion and the assassination of the presidential candidate of the PRI. This seemed to
forebode an extremely complicated and perhaps dangerous outcome if they were not
completely transparent. This is what convinced a considerable number of NGO’s to
organize a civic alliance (Alianza Cívica) to observe them.
Alianza Cívica thus gave an important step to become a net of NGO’s capable of
influencing Mexican politics. In fact, it was their pressure that achieved the creation of a
totally independent electoral institution: the Federal Electoral Institute6, after the 1997
elections when the PRI lost the majority at the chamber of deputies. Other important con-
tributions to the democratization of the country by the Civic Alliance, were that it helped
to increase the awareness of the population on the importance of elections, implemented
the first experiences concerning direct democracy in Mexico (it organized the first inde-
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pendent citizen consultations and referendums), and began a campaign to demand
accountability from government functionaries, including the president (Ramirez Sáiz
1997).
Nevertheless, this NGO movement did not try to lead the opposition struggle against
the ancient regime, as it did in other countries such as Hungary and East Germany, and
partly also in Czechoslovakia and Brazil. In Mexico, Alianza Civica decided that it
would maintain its neutrality with regards to the political scenario. It meant to be an orga-
nization dedicated to observe elections and eventually organize citizen consultations on
topics of national interest, without taking sides. This “neutrality” made itself most appa-
rent when it rejected the appeal of the zapatista rebellion in 1994, demanding that civil
society takes sides with it against the regime.
The neutral stand of Alianza also determined that this NGO net did not institutiona-
lize into a permanent organization, which would have allowed it to have an influence in
the aftermath of the elections. This was evident from declarations on the part of some of
its leaders in the sense that once the elections were organized by an independent and citi-
zen controlled institution, the civic alliance had practically lost its raison d’être. At this
point, it was more important to act at the political level in order to press for laws to insu-
re human rights and limits to State action7.
In this manner, although the Mexican NGO’s were very active and achieved a degree
of organization that was crucial to focus attention on the elections, which finally decided
the defeat of the PRI, the fact that they never adopted an open opposition stand to the aut-
horitarian regime made them lose momentum in the aftermath of the July elections of
2000. They thus contributed to make the transition possible, without ever acting directly
against the ancient regime. They nevertheless contributed to increase the density of civic
society.
Another important civic movement is the Barzón (Mackinlay 2000; Torres 1997;
Williams 1996), which was originally organized by medium and small agricultural pro-
ducers in defense of their property threatened by their financial situation in the mid-nine-
ties. At that moment, conjunctural and structural events coincided to make it impossible
for them to pay their debts. This movement started in 1993 with tractors blocking down-
town Guadalajara and the international bridge linking Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua with El
Paso, Texas. Up until the end of 1994, the Barzón maintained its fundamentally agrarian
identity. But the financial crisis of December of that year and the increase in interest rates
to more than 100% in 1995, led thousands of middle class credit card, automobile and
housing debtors to join the movement.
With its expansion into the middle class the Barzón managed to persist throughout
the administration of Zedillo; continuously contesting the financial policy of the govern-
ment and obliging it to decree three different plans intended to reduce and restructure
their debts. The movement also managed to prevent massive expropriation of debtor pro-
perty by the banks. Nonetheless, the most important accomplishment of this movement
was that, although it did not explicitly demand the democratization of the regime, it cle-
arly contested its technocratic and authoritarian character. In this respect, the pressure it
exerted throughout Zedillo’s administration, led Congress to radically modify the law
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sent by the executive in order to convert the FOBAPROA8 into public debt. The Barzón
exerted enough pressure on the legislators to force them to proclaim a law that would
allow Congress to investigate some of the larger debts to inquire if a fraud was commit-
ted. It also achieved substantial discounts for small and medium sized debtors, which the
government programs had not included.
In this manner, this movement questioned one of the most important policy measures
of the Zedillo government, the banking system bail-out, contributing to further wear out the
legitimacy of the regime and to increase the prestige of the opposition parties. Nevertheless,
as many of the middle class members of the Barzón and some of the peasants saw their eco-
nomic expectations turn brighter with the final financial plan and the economic growth of
the last years of the Zedillo administration, the movement lost its momentum.
The most important social movement of this period, and probably since 1968 was
surely the zapatista rebellion of 1994 (Harvey 1994; Le Bot & Subcomandante Marcos
1999; Leyva 1995; López Monjardin 1999). This movement has both a social and a cul-
tural element. It also has an ethical character as it represents the demands of the most
marginalized sector of the Mexican society, rather than the defense of corporatist privi-
leges that are being retrieved, as most other popular movements do. Although the indi-
genous population was supposed to be integrated in the national-popular project, after the
presidency of Cárdenas it was permanently marginalized with regards to other sectors
like labor or the rest of the peasantry. In fact, in order to get what was promised to the
indigenous population but was never delivered, they had to fuse into the peasant organi-
zations, adopt the generic peasant identity and abandon their cultural specificity.
The zapatista movement does not arise from a sector of society that has been relega-
ted by the new economic project or that has lost the support of the Mexican State. It is
rather a sector of society hurt by erratic public policies that have rendered difficult its
modernization efforts. The zapatista rebellion does not come from the poorest and most
marginalized of the indigenous population, but from a sector that has tried to organize
itself and modernize in economic terms. It represents those that tried to modernize the
culture and commercialization of coffee in the Lacandón Forest, but failed due to the
indiscriminate opening of the Mexican economy and of the complete lack of govern-
mental regulation.
They also arise from the frustration that has resulted from the systematic repression
of the independent peasant associations by the government of Chiapas, and of the coop-
tation of the most important regional organization: the Union de Uniones de Chiapas
(later ARIC). This situation has systematically blocked all legal channels of representa-
tion, and implies the destruction of the legal organization efforts on the part of the popu-
lation of the region, rather than a desperate position (Le Bot, op. cit.).
The Reform of article 27 of the Constitution by the Salinas government with the
acceptance of the national peasant organizations, that signified the end of the Agrarian
Reform and allows for the dismantling of the existing “ejidos”, has not only endangered
the basis of the efforts of economic modernization of the indigenous population, but the
material basis of their identity. It thus marked the end of their disposition to erase their
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differences in order to fight for their rights as peasants through the agrarian organiza-
tions, and determined their will to fight for their economic and social demands through
the affirmation of their identity.
In contrast to other Mexican and Latin American guerrillas, from the very beginning
the zapatistas did not set themselves to take over power, but rather to oust the Salinas
government and allow the Mexican Congress to define a new government and the modi-
fication of the economic model. On the other hand, their concept of identity, difference
and democracy are not determined in exclusive terms. They pose an inclusive rather than
an exclusive concept of identity; which is dominant in other contexts such as that of East
and Central Europe and the Middle East. The EZLN holds a concept of democracy that
goes beyond elections, that implies the capacity of society to accept all the existing
identities and projects, without assuming the disappearance of the differences. It does not
oppose indigenous to national identity, but supposes that the existence of the nation, like
that of democracy, depends on the acceptance of all the existing different identities. This
point is especially pertinent in an international context were national identities tend to be
erased in order to impose a globalized homogeneity, and has been the fact determining
the ample international impact of this movement.
Although this movement is the most comprehensive social movement of the last
decades, its violent origin and the fact that the Zedillo government managed to limit it to
its military character by encircling it with the Mexican army, dramatically reduced its
capacity to extend to civic society and become an open social and political movement9.
It was nevertheless crucial as a catalyzer of the electoral reform of 1994 that created the
Federal Electoral Institute, and thus greatly contributed to the democratization of the
country. The situation seems to be changing dramatically with the long march of the
“zapatistas” to Mexico City in February-March 2001, where they have shown the capa-
city to not only represent the indian population of Mexico, but have shown they have the
potentiality to become an ample movement against the economic project established
since the 80’s, that the government of Fox continues to apply.
2.3. The entrepreneurs
Although the popular and social movements prepared the ground for the transition,
they did not play a central role as in other contexts such as the Brazilian and the East
European (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary). The central role was in many senses reser-
ved to the entrepreneurs (Alba 1997; Luna, Tirado y Valdés 1995; Puga 1993). To unders-
tand their intervention it is necessary to go back a few years, to the beginning of the
seventies. The government of Echeverría not only liberalized the relationship between the
State and the popular organizations that were its social basis, but in so doing alienated one
of its main economic allies: the entrepreneurs. The attitude of the Echeverría government
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towards the popular organizations and the aggressive rhetoric against private capital ope-
ned a new front against the old regime, which in retrospect resulted decisive.
The Mexican entrepreneurs had been traditionally subordinated to the authoritarian
political regime and to the economic project. They were economically dependent on a
State that acted as the main agent of development for almost 50 years (from 1936 to
1982), stimulating economic growth and closing the economy from international concu-
rrence. Politically, the Mexican regime assured social peace, necessary to assure their
investments and interests, by controlling the popular sectors, per se, and by preventing
labor from exerting excessive pressure on their benefits when demanding better salaries
and working conditions.
Both dimensions of the relation between the State and the entrepreneurs began to
change at the beginning of the seventies. A more mature entrepreneurial class, that had
expanded during the almost 30 years of continuous economic growth, began to contest
the economic terrain occupied by the State. This conflict became most acute during the
presidency of Echeverría, when the State significantly increased its investment and the
regulation of the economy. One of their first battles was fought against the government’s
project to impose a significant tax reform, which they managed to abort.
On the other hand, the basic political warranty the regime gave the entrepreneurs
began to fade away during the same period. As part of Echeverría’s strategy to reaffirm
the popular basis of the Mexican political regime, the president began to rhetorically
attack the entrepreneurs. In addition, the support given the independent unions and pea-
sant organizations resulted in significant strike waves and land invasions, that were seen
as a threat by the Mexican entrepreneurs. This led to open recriminations against the
government, that reached a high point when in 1973 the guerrilla assassinated one of the
most prominent entrepreneurs of the country, Eugenio Garza Sada, leader of the
Monterrey group. At his burial, the Garza family openly accused the president of having
created an opinion against entrepreneurs that had shaken social peace in Mexico.
The clash between the entrepreneurs and the State did not subside after this event. On
the contrary, it increased forcing the employers to transform their organizations that were
subordinate to the State in a similar manner as the labor and peasant ones, into closer
representations of their interests. One of the main events in this respect was the creation
in 1975 of the Employers Coordinating Council, a centralized organ representing all the
entrepreneurs, that were usually divided between sectors. The clash reached a new high
when the day before Echeverría left office, he expropriated a large extension of some of
the best lands of the country in North East Mexico, in order to constitute one of the lar-
gest conglomerates of collective farms (ejidos).
From this moment on, the entrepreneur’s perception of the Mexican regime changed.
And as in other transitions, the entrepreneurs (in this case mostly small and mid-sized)
adopted a definite opposition stand against the authoritarian regime. They realized that
although the regime had been an essential factor of political stability that had perfectly
suited their interests, it could revert against them. This feeling was increased tenfold
when the government of López Portillo that had succeeded in regaining their confidence
by dismantling the independent unions, putting an end to land invasions, generously
compensating the expropriated lands, and pursuing an economic policy favorable to their
interests, nationalized the banking system, three months before leaving office in
September 1982.
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The entrepreneurs thus realized that their traditional attitude of exerting pressure on
government through their organizations in order to force it to give them a better treatment
had become ineffective. The definite proof had been the fact that during the administra-
tion of Lopez Portillo everything they had achieved had been reverted. From then on, the
entrepreneurs decided to recur not only to their corporatist organizations, but to parti-
cipate directly in politics in order to struggle for the transformation of the regime.
The participation of the entrepreneurs was mainly achieved through the National
Action Party (PAN), which eventually won the presidential elections that culminated the
electoral dimension of the transition. In fact, from 1982 on the entrepreneurs contributed
in creating a new current inside the PAN that distinguished itself from the traditional
members of this party in that the were more pragmatic, less dogmatic, prone to negotia-
te with the government in order to gain power positions, rather than conceiving their acti-
vity as an example to politically educate the Mexican population (Barraza/Bizberg
1992).
Although the activity of the Mexican entrepreneurs in the transition process was
partly against the intervention of the Mexican State in the economy, that was competing
with their interests, their main rationale was political. The impulse to directly enter poli-
tics was designed to defeat an authoritarian regime that had gone from protecting the
interests of the Mexican entrepreneurs to attacking them through arbitrary measures. On
the other hand, the fact that the entrepreneurs basically responded under a political ratio-
nale, resulted in greatly strengthening the PAN, to the extent that the current they led
eventually won the elections against the PRI, and became the “winners” of the transition
and the main resource of functionaries of the new government of Vicente Fox.
3. Conclusions
We accept the idea that democracy is more than a transition from an authoritarian
regime that does not hold elections to another regime that warranties a free and compe-
titive electoral system. That transition to democracy refers to a broader process of res-
tructuring society in the sense of establishing social relations (through the action of social
associations, organizations and movements) and increasing the capacity of society to
work upon the conflicts that social life inevitably generates. Democracy also implies that
social conflicts are solved in institutional and peaceful terms, respecting identities and
differences. This means that one of the indicators of democracy is the existence of a
dense civic society, be it organized through civic associations, class organizations, or
social movements. Both class and social movements have to be capable of self-restrain-
ment in order to allow their institutionalization as Touraine and Arato have posed.
Finally, institutionalization does not mean to solve conflicts by way of dissolving social
differences, but to construct (in Berger and Luckmann’s terms) socially accepted ways of
working upon differences by constituting what Sabel has defined as constitutional orders.
This helps us to discuss the characteristics of the Mexican transition toward democracy.
The main characteristic of the Mexican transition is that although the autonomous
organizations and movements that emerged succeeded in eroding the legitimacy and sta-
bility of the ancient regime, they were not decisive to bring it down. The ancient regime
in Mexico did not confront a social movement such as Solidarity, or the insurgence of
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civil society, like in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, or the combined action
of the entrepreneurs, the union movement and the NGO’s in Brazil.
In consequence, the Mexican transition seems to lack the social forces to attain its
completion. It differs from the Latin American, where the civilians dismantled the old
institutions once the military left government and went back to the barracks. It also dif-
fers from some Central European cases, where the absolute lack of market and political
institutions, forced the new social and political organizations to construct the economic
and political institutions at the round tables and through the elaboration of new constitu-
tions. Moreover, although the Mexican regime was profoundly worn-out, it did not
collapse like the Communist regime of the Soviet Union.
We have seen that most of the organized social forces: unions, peasant and other popu-
lar organizations, have been effectively controlled by the State until the present. On the
other hand, although the organization of civil society has advanced considerably (as wit-
nessed by the hundreds of NGO’s created and the success of “Alianza Cívica”) and there
two very important social movements emerged (the Barzón and the EZLN) in the last
years, for different reasons neither of these has been able to take the lead of the struggle
against the ancient regime. This has meant that there is no social movement able to capi-
talize the defeat of the PRI and have the necessary impetus to dismantle the old regime.
The demise of the old regime in Mexico was basically the consequence of the devel-
opment of the electoral system. What actually happened is that the balance of the electo-
ral-political just tipped against the ancient regime. The fact that the electoral victory was
the result of a diffuse (although broadly generalized) rejection of the old regime and of a
very loose and unorganized alliance of electoral attitudes, is a sign of the fact that there is
no sufficiently strong social power or coalition to force the necessary dismantling of the
institutions of the ancient regime and the construction of the new ones. The fact that the
popular classes are still basically under the control of the PRI, or are too weak to have a
real impact on the reconstruction of civil society, means that a restoration is one of the pos-
sible scenarios. This will be so unless the opposition, now government, and the real oppo-
sition (other than the PRI) can find the social basis needed to demolish the institutions and
organizations this party still controls and to occupy the spaces vacated by the PRI.
Nevertheless, the capacity of the PRI to continue controlling the popular organiza-
tions may change with the electoral alternance. The great question is if notwithstanding
the loss of the presidency, the PRI will manage to maintain under its control the popular
organizations without the aid of the State, or if we will see the dispersion of these forces
and their passing to the opposition. But this question does not only have to do with the
existence of an opposition inside these popular organizations controlled by the PRI, but
also with the manner in which the government led by Fox will or will not continue using
the mechanisms of control of the popular organizations in the hands of the State, that the
PRI governments used exhaustively. In the case of labor, for example, Fox’s government
may be tempted to make use of the ample faculties of the Ministry of Labor in order to
control the trade unions and favor economic stability sacrificing their democratization.
On the other hand, the legitimacy of the PRI may be refurbished if the government con-
tinues to apply neo-liberal measures without an effective social policy. We have witnes-
sed how this evolution in the case of Eastern Europe led to the return of the communist
party into power. The aggravator in the Mexican case is the fact that most of the institu-
tions of the ancient regime are practically intact.
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Nevertheless the most probable scenario is that the neo-liberal measures, accompanied
with obstacles to social organization will further weaken civic society. The fact that the
main actor of the Mexican transition is the entrepreneurial current of the PAN will probably
have further consequences. On the one hand, the fact that the pressure of the entrepreneurs
on government passed through politics and that the worker’s unions were maintained
subordinate to the State and almost absolutely quiescent through all these years when the
new economic model was implemented, contributed to maintaining the employers and
their organizations as paternalistic and as opposed to workers unions as ever. On the other
hand, the conception that the entrepreneurs in government surely will be individual, rather
than collective, electoral rather than social. This coincides with the way in which the PAN
has governed in the states it has won elections. Society is seen as a conglomerate of indi-
viduals that have to invest themselves individually in order to progress. Government has to
be organized so as to deliver services efficiently to this society of individuals, and to pater-
nalistically help those who cannot be considered as citizens (due to poverty, lack of edu-
cation, health, etc.), and eventually educate them in order to realize what their real interest
is. This means that they consider citizenship in purely individual terms, as the right that
people –conceived as clients of government services– have to complain against, or chan-
ge, the functionaries in charge of these service-rendering institutions. In this perspective,
conflict is not an inherent part of social life and it does not require collective solutions nor
social organization. It is conceived as a default, a sign of inefficiency on the part of gov-
ernment. Social conflicts are also seen as ways through which political forces instrumen-
talize individuals. They are thus conceived as a disruption of normal social life.
This posture towards society may mean that the decomposition of the authoritarian
and corporatist regime that has dominated the Mexican transition may continue, and that
during Fox’s presidency the central power factor of the old regime, the presidency will
continue losing its grip on the political system and the social organizations and will go
on being substituted by the process of power dispersion. Without on impulse towards the
reconstruction of society through a propositive attitude on the part of Fox’s government
or by the existence of social forces that may impose themselves, the process of power
feudalization will surely continue.
In this scenario, the presidency will have to increasingly deal with the more conservati-
ve forces entrenched at the local space. Tabasco and Yucatan are two examples of the man-
ner in which local “caciques” are responding to the weakening of the central power of the
presidency. Other disturbing radical examples concern the expansion of illegal forces in
many regions of Mexico. Although one may suppose that the centralization of resources that
exists in Mexico could impose a degree of control upon the evolution of this dispersion, the
fact that the Mexican State has been abandoning many of its former functions of coordina-
tion and of its financial programs through both decentralization and reduction of State spen-
ding, means that the State has significantly reduced its capacity of leverage in this respect.
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